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Abstract. Public Private Partnership (PPP) has been extensively used as an innovative and 
integrated form of project delivery, especially for large-scale infrastructure projects. When a 
PPP concession is about to expire, the PPP law may require a study to compare benefits and 
risks as part of the decision to renew or end the contract. The study, based on expected 
value analysis, will be used by the contracting authority for negotiating with the incumbent 
over terms such as contract duration and revenue sharing rate. However, a major flaw of 
expected value analysis is the inability to provide a possible risk profile of the contracting 
agency or concessionaire. Accordingly, this paper presents a computational framework for 
determination of the contract duration and the revenue sharing rate using Monte Carlo 
simulation and a risk premium approach. The proposed framework can be used to depict 
the risk profile of the concessionaire under different contract durations and revenue sharing 
rates. To illustrate how the proposed model can be applied in practice, a PPP toll road 
project is adopted as the case study. The results of the study suggest that the revenue sharing 
rate is the key to the negotiation of the contract to be renewed. The proposed method may 
be used by governments for negotiation with an incumbent concessionaire or to achieve a 
fair price when a competitive retendering process is considered. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Infrastructure plays a critical role in economic and 
social development [1]. It enables the delivery of goods 
and services that help stimulate economic growth and 
ensure people’s quality of life. In recent decades, a 
program called Public Private Partnership (PPP) has been 
increasingly used by governments around the world as an 
innovative way of financing large-scale infrastructure 
projects. Public Private Partnership may be defined as a 
contractual relationship governing a long-term public-
sector acquisition and private sector provision of public 
works and services [2, 3]. Very often, PPP projects are 
arranged using a mechanism called Build-Operate-
Transfer (BOT) in which a public entity (i.e., a contracting 
authority) is involved in contracting a private entity to 
design, finance, build, operate, and maintain a facility for 
an agreed period (i.e., concession period), and then 
transfer the facility to the public entity at the end of 
concession period. A variant of a BOT contract is Build-
Transfer-Operate (BTO) in which the transfer of the 
facility occurs at the completion of construction. 
In some countries such as Thailand, when a PPP 
concession is about to expire, the PPP law requires a study 
to compare benefits and risk as part of the decision to 
renew or end the contract. Usually, the study, based on 
expected value or deterministic analysis, will be conducted, 
and the results will be used by the contracting authority 
for negotiating with the incumbent over terms such as 
contract duration and revenue sharing rate. However, a 
major flaw of expected value analysis is the inability to 
provide a possible risk profile of the contracting agency or 
concessionaire, i.e., a range of possible outcomes [4]. 
Therefore, before making a decision related to the 
expiration of a PPP contract, the contracting authority 
may need additional information about the risk profile of 
the contracting agency itself and that of the concessionaire.  
The main benefit of concession renewal is that it 
offers an important incentive to the incumbent to perform 
satisfactorily and comply with both contracted and non-
contractible quality standards. Thus, concession renewal 
can be treated as a reward for good past performance [5]. 
It also gives the public agency an exit option so that the 
agency can manage the project itself or retender the 
project using auction methods, such as the Least-Present-
Value-of-Revenue (LPVR) proposed by Engel et al. [6] (see 
Fig. 1 for the public agency’s available options illustrated 
as a decision tree). As shown in Fig. 1, the decision tree 
contains a sequence of alternating decision nodes and 
chance nodes. Decision nodes are the moments when 
possible courses of action are considered and a decision is 
made. Chance nodes represent the probabilities that 
different future outcomes may occur in the period(s) after 
a decision is made. In the renewal of a concession contract, 
two of the most significant negotiated terms are:  
 
(1) the length or duration  




A2: Public agency s responsibility (e.g., own 
management or through management contract)Operation phase
Construction phase
Concession period












Fig. 1. Alternatives available at the end of a PPP 
concession contract. 
 
Therefore, the aim of this paper is to equip the 
contracting authority, which is the decision maker (DM) 
of a PPP project, with a simple and straightforward 
computational model for the determination of the 
duration of the contract to be renewed, denoted as M , and 
the optimal revenue sharing rate, denoted as  , that will 
ensure both the efficiency and bankability of the 
infrastructure project. In the proposed computational 
framework, we also present how the risk-adjusted 
discount rate associated with each type of cash flow 
should be computed so that the contract duration and the 
revenue sharing rate can be appropriately determined. For 
risk-based analysis, both sensitivity analysis and Monte 
Carlo simulation will be employed to provide the risk 
profile of the concessionaire, based on different revenue 
sharing rates, so as to bracket an appropriate range for the 
revenue sharing rate, i.e.,  ,l u  , which can be employed 
by the contracting agency in the negotiation with the 
incumbent. In addition, to illustrate how the proposed 
model can be used in practice, a real project, namely, the 
Second Stage Expressway System (SSES), an elevated 
BTO road located in Bangkok, will be adopted for the case 
study.  
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. 
We begin by providing a literature review, followed by an 
explanation of a method commonly used for determining 
the contract period of a PPP arrangement. Next, we 
present a computational framework for the determination 
of contract time and revenue sharing rate, followed by a 
risk analysis using sensitivity analysis and Monte Carlo 
simulation, with a brief discussion of the principles 
employed to determine the contract duration and the 
optimal revenue sharing rate. Then, we address the issue 
of risk premium calculation used in valuing public and 
private projects. Once the computational framework has 
been fully explained, the model will be populated with data 
from a case study project to provide a numerical example 
that illustrates how the proposed framework and method 
can be applied in practice.   This is followed by the results 
and discussion. Finally, we close the paper with 
conclusions and implications of the findings. 
 
2. Literature Review 
 
The rationale for introducing PPPs into infrastructure 
provision comprises the many expected advantages of 
bundling the project phases and making use of the profit 
seeking motives, diligence, and experience of private 
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parties [7]. From an economic viewpoint, the justification 
for PPPs is that they increase efficiency by aligning the 
incentives of the involved parties [8]. To some, PPPs may 
also be viewed as a way of introducing private sector 
technology and innovation to the provision of public 
services with improved operational efficiency [9].  
In principles, the designs of PPP contracts depend 
largely on how risks are allocated between the public and 
the private parties [10], which is essentially the core 
principle of PPPs (i.e., risks should be transferred to the 
party that can best manage them, and with the lowest 
possible costs). For example, in a Build-Operate-Transfer 
(BOT) setting, a private company (also known as a 
concessionaire) is responsible for the risks related to the 
design, financing, construction, and operation and 
maintenance (O&M) of the project for an agreed period 
(the concession period). The private company also 
assumes exogenous risks, such as market or demand risk, 
during the operation period. The improved risk 
management of this BOT arrangement, in theory, plays a 
crucial role in increasing the efficiency of delivery of the 
project.  
However, this is not a one-way street; PPPs have also 
been the subject of criticism. For example, risk sharing 
between the government and concessionaires has always 
been a concern among practitioners and policy makers 
[11]. In addition, PPPs usually involve several parties with 
diverging goals, making them vulnerable to an economic 
dilemma known as a principal-agent (P-A) problem [12]. 
Moreover, there are issues related to the inherently 
incomplete nature of PPP contracts (e.g., problems with 
renegotiation of contracts and the potential opportunistic 
behavior of concessionaires) [13]. Finally, in reality, risk is 
always changing, and optimal risk allocation may not be 
attainable. As a result, in the face of unprecedented high 
risk, renegotiation of a contract may be unavoidable. 
These characteristics of PPP projects make it very difficult 
for the contracting agency to design optimal risk allocation 
at the outset of the PPP contract. 
In a PPP arrangement, the high cost of financing the 
project will be recovered through fee revenues generated 
by the services/products provided by the project over the 
contract period. Just as construction and operation and 
maintenance (O&M) costs are certainly subject to risk, so 
are the revenues to be received over the operation period, 
which are subject to market or economic risks. Therefore, 
the determination of an appropriate concession period is 
crucial to the PPP project’s financial viability.  
The United Nations Economic and Social 
Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP), for 
example, recommends that concession periods range 
between 15 and 30 years, depending on the results of each 
project’s financial analysis [14]. However, for typical PPP 
transportation projects in Thailand, the concession period 
is assumed to be at least 30 years, which is long enough to 
allow the concessionaire to recoup the initial investment 
and O&M costs, plus a sufficient amount of profit for the 
assumed risk. Because of the long period of the PPP 
contract and substantial risk transfer to the private entity, 
there has been a focus on risk analysis in several PPP 
studies, such as the study of critical risk factors (CRFs) in 
Vietnam by Likhitruangsilp et al. [15], and risk reduction 
through the bundling of small and medium PPP projects 
by Kato and Matsumaru [16]. 
In theory, concession duration can be determined in two 
ways: one is exogenous, the other is endogenous.  
The exogenous approach is widely used by public 
agencies at the design stage. In this case, the contract 
duration is determined by exogenous factors such as 
demand for the services or a change in macroeconomic 
conditions. There have been many studies related to the 
determination of new or greenfield PPP projects using this 
approach. Most of these are based on financial techniques 
such as expected NPV, NPV-at-risk or payback period. 
For example, Ye and Tiong [17] provided a conceptual 
framework for determining the duration of a new BOT 
project using a risk-return trade-off technique. Shen and 
Li [18] used expected investment return to determine the 
payback period of a PPP project. Researchers such as Ye 
and Tiong [19], Miller [20], Zhang [3], and Yu and Lam 
[21] also explicitly relied on PPP financial models based 
on the discounted cash flow (DCF) method. Ng et al. [22] 
proposed a more advanced method, using a simulated 
model for optimizing PPP concession periods. 
 However, in some circumstances and when 
permitted by law, the concession duration may be 
determined endogenously. For example, if the Least-
Present-Value-of-Revenue (LPVR) is used as an award 
criterion, the contract will last until the winning private 
partner receives the LPVR it submitted [6]. Another 
endogenous approach was proposed by Shen et al. [23], 
who used game theory for determination of contract 
duration. 
To date, studies concerned with the duration of a 
renewed concession in a PPP are quite limited. Many of 
those that exist have focused on lease renewal in real estate 
markets (e.g., [24, 25]). Relevant to this research is a study 
by Contreras and Angulo [26], who proposed an option-
pricing model for valuing the impact on the public budget 
arising from extension options embedded in a build-
operate-finance-transfer (BOFT) arrangement. As for 
research on revenue sharing mechanisms, there are several 
currently focused on new greenfield PPP projects. For 
example, a recent study by Wang and Liu [27] used 
principal-agent (P-A) models to determine the excess 
revenue sharing ratios in PPP projects. Moreover, a 
number of articles have focused on the revenue risk 
management of a PPP using real options analysis. 
Examples of these studies include Chiara et al. [28], Ashuri 
et al. [29], and Kokkaew and Chiara [30]. 
 
3. Determination of Contract Duration 
 
In this paper, we will adopt the exogenous approach 
to the determination of the concession duration. This 
method can be applied for both new contracts and 
contracts to be renewed. Accordingly, we will study and 
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compare the results between two alternatives (see  
Fig. 1):  
 
A1: contract renewal 
A2: management under public agency’s responsibility 
 
Once the contract duration is exogenously 
determined, the optimal revenue sharing mechanism can 
be established. It should be noted that, for the sake of 
comparison between the options to renew or not to renew 
the concession, option A3 (Retendering process) is not 
included in our analysis. However, if the decision arrived 
at is alternative A2, then the contracting authority may use 
the expected benefits as a benchmark price for a new 
competitive retendering process to provide value for 
money or VfM.  
As for determination of the optimal revenue sharing 
rate, it should be the one at which the concessionaire’s 
required rate of return on equity cash flow (ECF) is close 
to zero. It should be noted that the right to make the decision 
to renew or to end the contract rests solely with the contracting 
authority. To make an objective decision, the contracting 
authority, therefore, must compare the present worth of 
net benefits associated with each alternative. In addition, 
the discount rate for each stream of future revenues must 
be appropriately calculated. This is mainly because 
different cash flows are subject to different levels of risk, 
and they should be discounted with appropriate discount 
rates to compensate for the risk of the undertaking. We 
acknowledge that the choice of discount rates is a 
contentious topic; however, simply ignoring this fact 
could give rise to misleading results. 
To determine the financial viability of a PPP project, 
discounted cash flow (DCF) methods such as net present 
value (NPV) are commonly employed by PPP analysts. In 
the DCF analysis, future cash flow must be discounted 
using an appropriate discount rate to compensate for the 
risk exposure from the undertaking. In addition, to 
determine an appropriate concession duration for each 
PPP project, risk factors such as product prices, market 
demand, and the like should be incorporated into the 
financial analysis [31]. Initial investments such as 
construction or rehabilitation and renovation cost will be 
estimated; so too will the future stream of project revenues 
and operation and maintenance (O&M) costs.  
By using the minimum required rate of return as a 
discount rate ( r ), the net present value (NPV) of the 
project’s cash flows can be calculated. For example, 
adapted from Zhang [2], the net present value (NPV) of a 
PPP road project may be computed by 
 
0
( ) ( )
(1 )
t N








− +  − 
=
+
                     (1) 
 
where tI   is initial investment made in year t  ; tT   is 
traffic volume in year t ; t  is average toll rate in year t ;  
t  is average unit operation and maintenance cost in year 
t ; r  is required rate of return or cost of capital using 
weighted average cost of capital or WACC, and N  is the 
number of concession years. 
Based on Eq. (1), the number of concession years 
should be the length of time ( N ) at which the project’s 
net present value (NPV) is zero. This approach to the 
determination of concession period may be called a 
deterministic approach, and its result a predetermined 
period.  
In reality, construction costs, operating revenues, and 
O&M costs will certainly be different from initial 
estimates. One can think of these variables as a set of risk 
factors influencing a financially optimal concession period, 
which could be either shorter or longer than originally 
estimated. As a result, some researchers such as Engel et 
al. [6] and Vassallo [32] have suggested that the concession 
period, which is unknown at the outset of the contract, 
should be a function of future revenue, and that the 
concession shall end when the present value of future 
revenue covers the cost of construction and operation, 
plus a sufficient amount of business profit for the private 
concessionaire. This approach to the determination of 
concession period can be called a flexible approach, and 
its result a stochastic concession period.  
As for the determination of the number of years ( M ) 
to be specified in a new contract, the same principle as that 
mentioned above can be applied. It should be noted that 
if operating revenues are to be shared by the contracting 
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where  is revenue sharing rate; tDS is debt service in year 
t  ; tTax  is tax payment in year t , and Er  is the required 
rate of return on equity. 
 
4. Computational Framework 
 
In general, there are three players who benefit 
financially from the operation of PPP road projects. The 
first is the concessionaire (denoted as C), who collects toll 
revenues and who retains operating cash flows after 
deduction of the revenue share, debt service, and tax 
payments. The second entity is the contracting authority 
(denoted as A), who may receive a revenue share from the 
concession at an agreed sharing rate. Finally, the 
government (denoted as G) benefits from tax collection, 
both in terms of goods and services tax or value added tax 
(VAT), and corporate tax. 
 
4.1. Decision Making Process of Contracting 
Authority 
 
A decision tree can be employed to model how the 
contracting authority reaches a decision at the end of 
concession contract (i.e., to renew or to end the contract), 
as depicted in Fig. 2. 
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A1: Contract renewal






















   1 11 A AE A E G A= +
   2 22 A AE A E G A= +
 
 
Fig. 2. Decision tree representing the comparison of 
alternatives A1 and A2 at the end of a PPP concession 
contract. 
 
As can be seen in Fig. 2, in theory, the decision to 
renew or not to renew should be analytically made by 
comparing the expected net present value (NPV) of A1 
(Contract renewal) and that of A2 (Contract expiration). 
If the expected net present value (NPV) of A1 is greater 
than that of A2 (Contract expiration), the contracting 
authority should renew the concession ( [ 1] [ 2]E A E A ); 
otherwise, the contracting authority should take over the 
management of the project.  
Key assumptions used in this study include:  
 
(1) the revenue sharing rate is fixed over the contract 
duration, and  
(2) the contract has early termination clauses to 
provide the contracting authority an exit from the 
obligation in the case of concessionaire’s performance 
failure.  
Details about how to compute expected net benefits 
associated with each alternative are as follows. 
 
4.2. Modelling of Future Project Cash Flow 
 
4.2.1. Alternative A1: Contract Renewal 
 
The cash flow waterfall shown in Fig. 3 can be used 
to demonstrate how cash flow will be distributed between 















( ) 1f tr s L −+
 
 
Fig. 3. Cash flow waterfall of alternatives A1: Contract 
Renewal without revenue share. 
As shown in Fig. 3, if the decision of the contracting 
authority is to renew the concession contract “without 
revenue share,” expected annual net revenue for year t  of 
a PPP toll road concessionaire (denoted as 
1,A tE C   or 
1,
ˆ
A tC ) during the concession period can be computed, after 
rearranging the equation, as 
 
  ( ) ( )1 11A ,t t t t f t




= −  −  − + − 
 





A tC  is expected annual net revenue of the 
concessionaire in year t ;  c  is corporate tax rate; ˆt  and   
ˆ
t  is average toll price and unit O&M cost in year t , 
respectively; ˆ
tT  is expected traffic in year t  ; fr  and s  is 
the risk free rate and credit spread charged by lenders; 1tL −  
is outstanding debt in year 1t −  ; R  is total construction or 
rehabilitation cost, and n  is the number of operation 
years (i.e.,  /R n  is yearly depreciation). 
As for the government, expected annual cash flow 
( 1,
ˆ
A tG ) to be received from the concessionaire in a form of 
tax revenues is given by 
 
( ) ( )1 1A ,t t t t f t




=  −  − + − 
 
                  (4) 
 
However, in some projects, such as PPP toll roads in 
Thailand, toll revenues must be shared with the 
contracting authority. Therefore, Eq. (3) and Eq. (4) can 
be modified to account for shared revenues. Accordingly, 
the value of net benefits to be received by the contracting 
authority under alternative A1 (
1,A tA ) can be computed as 
 
( )1 1A ,t t t A ,tA T V =   −              (5) 
 
where λ  is revenue sharing rate for the contracting 
authority, and 
1,A tV  is value added tax (VAT) in year t , 















            (6) 
 
where   is the VAT rate (e.g., the current VAT rate in 
Thailand is 7%). 
Annual corporate tax revenue (
1,A tG ) in year t  and net 
revenue for the concessionaire (
1,A tC ) are estimated by the 
following equations   
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 
    (8) 
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Therefore, the upper bound of revenue sharing rate 
( u ) can be calculated as 
 
( )1, ; , 0A t u ENPV C r =                    (9) 
 
where NPV is a function of one variable, namely, 
1,A tC , 
and two parameters: u  and Er . 
 
4.2.2. Alternative A2: Public Authority Own Management 
 
If the contracting agency decides to let the PPP 
contract expire so that it can operate the project itself or 
through a management contract, tolled revenue in year t  
( tY ) can be estimated by 
 
( )t t tY T=                   (10) 
 
If value added tax (VAT) is included in the tolled 
price, the total amount of VAT ( tV ) for each year can be 
computed using Eq. (6). Therefore, the annual income of 
the contracting authority (





A ,t t t t tA T
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   
=  −  −  −  
+  
,                            (11) 
 
where t  is average unit O&M cost in year t . 
 
4.3. Proposed Computational Framework 
 
Once the projected cash flow associated with each 
alternative is modelled, the net present value of each 
alternative must be compared using either (1) a risk 
premium approach (i.e., risky cash flow discounted using 
risk-adjusted interest rate), or (2) a certainty equivalent 
approach [33]. In this study, we adopt a risk premium 
approach to determine the risk-adjusted discount rate 
associated with each stream of cash flow. The 
computational framework proposed in this study is shown 




Fig. 4. Computational framework of the determination of 




5. Risk Analysis Using Monte Carlo Simulation 
 
5.1. Monte Carlo Simulation 
 
Once the computational framework is completed, 
Monte Carlo (MC) simulation can be employed to 
perform risk analysis. A basic process of MC simulation 




Fig. 5. Risk analysis using Monte Carlo simulation. 
 
5.2. A Risk Premium Approach 
 
The level of risk associated with each entity’s stream 
of future cash flow can be determined using a risk 
premium approach. The sequence of how toll revenue will 









Fig. 7. Cash flow modelling of A2 (Contract expiration). 
 
Present value (PV) of benefits to be received by the 
contracting authority for each alternative can be 
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  ( )1 1 11 A ,t A ,t A ,t f mPV A f V ,A ,G ;r ,r=                        (12) 
 
  ( )2 22 A ,t A ,t f mPV A f V ,A ;r ,r=                          (13) 
 
where PV for each alternative is a function of variables 
, ,V A  and G , and a set of two parameters: fr  (risk-free rate) 
and mr  (expected market risk). 
 
It should be noted that the duration ( M ) for the new 
contract should be the time that makes [ 1]PV A  greater 
than [ 2]PV A  to ensure that the contracting agency will 
benefit from PPP contract renewal. As for the appropriate 
revenue sharing rate (  ), theoretically, it is the rate at 
which the net present value (NPV) of concessionaire 
discounted by cost of equity ( Er ) is equal to zero.  
However, since substantial operational risks will be 
transferred to the concessionaire, this calculated revenue 
sharing rate will need to be adjusted to a level to which 
both the contracting agency and the concessionaire, 
through negotiation, can agree. Therefore, in this study, 
we proposed using a risk premium approach and Monte 
Carlo simulation for determining the revenue sharing rate 
that provides the contracting agency with a possible range 
for the revenue sharing rate. The results of such analysis 
may help the agency negotiate effectively with the 
incumbent concessionaire.  
 
6. Risk Premium Calculation 
 
As mentioned earlier, increased efficiency of PPPs 
may help governments provide services at lower cost than 
would be possible with public sector delivery [9]. 
Therefore, one of the most important criteria for assessing 
a PPP project is whether the cost to the government will 
be less with a PPP than with conventional public provision. 
This comparison must be based on present value, which 
requires identification and selection of an appropriate 
discount rate.  
The choice of discount rate to be used in this sort of 
analysis is controversial. Many researchers have taken the 
view that the discount rate used to evaluate public projects 
should be less than that used to assess a PPP [8]. The main 
argument of this view is that the public sector has risk 
pooling capacity; therefore, public projects should be 
assessed using lower discount rates. However, in practice, 
public infrastructure is usually operated independently by 
a responsible public agency, so the assumption of risk 
pooling capacity may not be accurate, and the use of a 
lower discount rate for the public project may lead to an 
overestimation of future benefits [34, 35]. However, a 
study by Grout [8] showed that the discount rates used for 
the public sector should be lower than those used for the 
private sector. His main argument was that the failure to 
do so suggests that private provision is less efficient than 
public management of service since the present value of 
private provision will be overestimated relative to public 
provision. Accordingly, the choice of discount rate should 
not be treated as trivial, especially for long life cycle 
undertakings such as transportation projects.  
In general, the cost of capital (debt plus equity) is 
often used as the discount rate for a PPP. If the capital 
structure (e.g., debt-to-equity ratio) is known, then the 
cost of capital may be computed using the weighted sum 
of the cost of the debt and the cost of the equity, formally 
known as weighted average cost of capital (WACC). For 
an infrastructure project, WACC should be used for the 
cash flow available for debt service (CADS) or free cash 
flow (FCF). However, for infrastructure investment, the 
capital structure will change over time since debt service 
will reduce the amount of outstanding debt. For this 
reason, Esty [36] argued that a PPP project should be 
assessed through equity cash flow using cost of equity, 
which remains constant over time. Cost of capital can be 
estimated using a method called the Capital Asset Pricing 
Model or CAPM [37]. For PPP infrastructure projects, the 
cost of capital for equity cash flow (ECF) can be 
computed by the following equation 
 
( )E f e m fr r r r Crp= +  − +         (14) 
 
where Er  is cost of equity; fr  is risk-free rate; mr  is expected 
market risk; e  is the equity beta of the project, and Crp  is 
country risk premium [38]. The country risk premium 
reflects the potential volatility of investments in a given 
country due to defaults associated with political or other 
events [38]. Estache and Pinglo [38] estimated that the 
country risk premium is around 5-8%. For example, for an 
upper-middle income country, country risk premium is 
about 6%. Therefore, if the average annual interest rate on 
government bonds over a 5-year period is used, the risk-
free rate is set at 4%.   Further, if the market risk for 
transportation infrastructure projects is, on average, 7.4%, 
and the equity beta of the project is set at 1.1%, then the 
cost of equity is calculated to be 13.74%.  
 
7. Numerical Example Using Case Study 
Project 
 
7.1. Project Setting and Arrangement 
 
In this study, we employed the Second Stage 
Expressway System, a built-transfer-operate (BTO) toll 
road in Bangkok, as the case study. The Bangkok 
Expressway and Metro (BEM) Public Company 
(Concessionaire) was granted, by the Expressway 
Authority of Thailand (Contracting Authority), the right 
to build and operate the project for 30 years, from 1990 to 
2020. The project comprises 4 sections (Sections A to D) 
with a total distance of 38.5 kilometers (see Fig. 8). In 
addition, the contractual arrangement is depicted in Fig. 9. 
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Fig. 8. Map of the Second Stage Expressway System in 





Fig. 9. Contractual arrangement of the case study project. 
 
7.2. Base case analysis 
 
In this case study, rehabilitation required at the outset 
of the contract is expected to cost about 6,450 million Thai 
baht (THB). The VAT rate ( ) and corporate tax rate ( c ) 
are fixed at 7% and 20%, respectively. For Alternative A1, 
we assume that the concessionaire will finance the 
required rehabilitation cost by utilizing 50% debt and 50% 
equity. The cost of lending ( D fr r s= + ) is assumed to be 
about 7%. Other parameters such as expected annual 
traffic volume ( ˆ
tT ), toll rate ( ˆt ), and unit operation cost 
( ˆt ) of the case study project and toll rate are presented in 
Table 1, and are graphically depicted in Fig. 10 and 11. 
 









1   259,035,640  32.55            11.83  
2   264,863,120  32.47            10.64  
3   270,690,600  32.39            10.82  
4   276,518,080  32.34            11.03  
5   280,428,560  32.32              9.87  
6   283,016,880  33.84              9.92  
7   285,605,200  34.46            10.05  
8   288,193,520  34.47            12.17  
9   290,781,840  34.50            12.09  
10   293,370,160  34.52            12.59  
11   295,958,480  35.98            16.79  







13   301,135,120  36.59            13.02  
14   303,723,440  36.62            13.68  
15   306,311,760  36.64            16.12  
16   308,900,080  38.43            15.46  
17   311,471,360  39.15            15.83  
18   312,896,520  39.27            16.59  
19   314,321,680  39.40            16.32  
20   315,746,840  39.52            16.75  
21   316,080,000  41.17            22.35  
22   316,080,000  41.81            20.76  
23   316,080,000  41.81            21.15  
24   316,080,000  41.82            22.48  
25   316,080,000  41.83            23.72  
26   316,080,000  43.45            23.76  
27   316,080,000  44.09            24.99  
28   316,080,000  44.10            26.51  
29   316,080,000  44.10            30.71  
30   316,080,000  44.10            31.45  
Source: Expressway Authority of Thailand, EXAT [39]. 
 
 
Fig. 10. Expected annual traffic volume of the case study 
project. 
 
Fig. 11. Expected average toll rates ( ˆ t ) and average unit 
O&M costs ( ˆt ) of  the case study project. 
 
Based on the equations presented in the previous 
section, the new revenue sharing rate ( u ) can be 
determined using Eq. (9), which is the rate at which the 
NPV of concessionaire equals zero. The appropriate 
discount rate for each stream of  cash flow can be 
computed using Eq. (14). For the case study project, the 
risk-free rate (
fr ) is 4%, market risk ( mr ) is 7.4%, and 
1.1e =  (we used the beta of  the company operating the 
project as a proxy for project beta). From Eq. (14), 
13.74Er =  ( Crp  is omitted since the project is a brownfield 
with recorded performance). An example of  the financial 
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analysis of  Alternative A1 with a 30-year contract is 
presented in Table 2. 
 
 










/R M  1,A tG  1,A tC  
0       3,225   -3,225 
1 8,431 552 4,058 -277 -226 -51 3,174 215 63 416 
2 8,600 563 4,139 -277 -222 -55 3,119 215 129 675 
3 8,768 574 4,220 -277 -218 -58 3,061 215 122 646 
4 8,942 585 4,304 -277 -214 -62 2,999 215 115 612 
5 9,063 593 4,362 -277 -210 -67 2,932 215 183 880 
6 9,577 627 4,609 -277 -205 -72 2,860 215 223 1,034 
7 9,842 644 4,737 -277 -200 -77 2,784 215 235 1,078 
8 9,935 650 4,782 -277 -195 -82 2,702 215 117 603 
9 10,032 656 4,829 -277 -189 -88 2,614 215 126 631 
10 10,127 663 4,874 -277 -183 -94 2,521 215 100 520 
11 10,648 697 5,125 -277 -176 -100 2,420 215  -    -418 
12 10,919 714 5,255 -277 -169 -107 2,313 215 177 816 
13 11,019 721 5,303 -277 -162 -115 2,198 215 139 657 
14 11,123 728 5,353 -277 -154 -123 2,075 215 103 505 
15 11,224 734 5,402 -277 -145 -131 1,944 215  -    -125 
16 11,870 777 5,713 -277 -136 -141 1,803 215 51 278 
17 12,195 798 5,870 -277 -126 -151 1,652 215 51 269 
18 12,288 804 5,914 -277 -116 -161 1,491 215 9 92 
19 12,385 810 5,961 -277 -104 -172 1,319 215 33 174 
20 12,479 816 6,006 -277 -92 -184 1,135 215 12 78 
21 13,012 851 6,263 -277 -79 -197 937 215  -    -1,443 
22 13,216 865 6,361 -277 -66 -211 726 215  -    -850 
23 13,216 865 6,361 -277 -51 -226 500 215  -    -970 
24 13,220 865 6,363 -277 -35 -242 259 215  -    -1,389 
25 13,221 865 6,364 -277 -18 -259 0 215  -    -1,782 
26 13,733 898 6,610     215  -    -1,286 
27 13,936 912 6,708     215  -    -1,582 
28 13,938 912 6,708     215  -    -2,061 
29 13,939 912 6,709     215  -    -3,390 
30 13,940 912 6,710     215  -    -3,623 
*Unit in million THB 
Table 3. Expected present value ( [ ]E NPV ) of each alternative (million Thai baht). 
 






A2: Contract  
expiration (15-year) 
Government (Value Added Tax) 12,322 12,322 7,075 7,075 
Contracting Authority (A) 59,951 56,443 41,052 40,562 
Government (Corporate Tax) 1,466 0 1,123 0 
Concessionaire (C) 0 0 0 0 
Revenue sharing rate  51.5% - 51.5% - 
Total 73,739 68,765 49,250 47,637 
 
 
In Table 2, when the duration of  the contract is 
assumed to be 30 years, the revenue sharing rate ( u ) can 
be determined by making the net present value of  the 
concessionaire’s benefits equal to zero (i.e., 
1,[ ( ; , )] 0A t u EE NPV C r = ). The upper bound of  revenue 
sharing rate in the case of  Alternative A1 with a 30-year 
contract is therefore about 51.5%. 
Expected net present value ( [ ]E NPV ) associated 
with each party for all remaining alternatives can be 
estimated as presented in Table 3. 
 
Based on the comparison of NPV shown in Table 
3, the contracting authority may opt to negotiate a 30-
year contract (of course, only with an exit clause 
included) because the increased benefit of the PPP 
renewal (i.e., the difference between NPV[A1] and 
NPV[A2]) is about 7% for a 30-year period, compared 
with just 3% for a 15-year contract. 
 
7.3. Sensitivity Analysis 
The base case analysis implies that a 30-year PPP 
contract may, in theory, benefit the contracting agency 
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more than would a 15-year contract (see Table 2). 
Therefore, we will use the case of a 30-year contract for 
the sensitivity analysis in order to determine which 
input has the greatest impact on the concessionaire’s 
NPV, based on Eq. (7). As shown in Eq. (7), key risk 
variables include traffic demand ( tT ), toll prices ( t ), 
and average unit operation costs ( ˆt ). As for credit 
spread charged by lenders ( s  ), in this study, this 
variable was not included in the sensitivity analysis 
because interest rates are expected to remain low and 
the principal of the loan will be repaid over a loan 
period of 25 years, which can help reduce the risk of 
interest fluctuation. The assumptions and results of this 
sensitivity analysis are shown in Table 4 and Fig. 12. 
 














t  20% 0.8 ˆt  1.2 ˆt  
Average unit 
operating cost  
ˆ





Fig. 12. Tornado diagram for concessionaire’s NPV. 
 
As can be seen in Fig. 12, unit operating cost ( t ) 
is the input that has the greatest impact on the 
concessionaire’s NPV. This input variable will then be 
used as the risk variable for risk analysis using Monte 
Carlo simulation. 
 
7.4. Monte Carlo simulation 
 
To determine the possible range of a 
concessionaire’s NPV resulting from uncertainty of 
operating cost, a Monte Carlo simulation is performed 
where the unit operating cost is assumed to follow a 
normal distribution with a mean of ˆt  and a coefficient 
of variation of 20%. Therefore, the stochastic variable 
unit operating cost is modelled as 
 
( )ˆ , 0.2t X t XX N    = = =     (15) 
 
For example, for year 1 and year 2 the unit 
operating costs are modelled as 
 
( )1 11.83, 2.37t XX N  = = = =  
 
( )2 10.64, 2.13t XX N  = = = =  
 




Fig. 13. Probability density of unit operating costs for 
year 1 (
1tX = ). 
 
7.5. Results of the Analysis 
 
The results of 10,000 simulations using MATLAB 




Fig. 14. Simulation of concessionaire’s risk profile. 
 
As illustrated in Fig. 14, by using a revenue sharing 
rate of 51.5% ( 0.515 = ), the expected NPV of the 
concessionaire is consistent with the theoretical value. 
However, there is a high risk that the concessionaire’s 
NPV will be negative. Therefore, concessionaire is 
likely to negotiate to reduce the level of risk. With our 
proposed model, the concessionaire’s NPV and risk 
profile associated with a revenue sharing rate (  ) can 
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Fig. 15. Concessionaire’s risk profile associated with 
each revenue sharing rate (  ). 
 
Based on the results shown in Fig. 15, the range of 
revenue sharing rate, i.e., [ , ]l u   may be specified as 
[ 0.48, 0.515]l u = = . As can be seen in Fig. 15, the 
concessionaire’s NPV-at-risk at a revenue sharing rate 
of 48% ( 0.48l = ) is about THB 2,000 million, with the 
probability of having negative NPV of about 2%. 
However, if the contracting authority were to increase 
its revenue share from the lower bound of 48% to the 
upper bound of 51.5% ( 0.515u = ), the 
concessionaire’s NPV-at-risk would be reduced from 
about THB 2,000 million to 0 million, with the 
probability of having negative NPV of about 50%. 
 
8. Conclusions 
PPP arrangements are undoubtedly increasing in 
popularity. Obviously, in the future, the concession 
contracts of these PPP projects will expire. Therefore, 
a decision about whether to renew or to end each 
contract -- that is, whether to renew the concession 
contract with the incumbent concessionaire for a 
certain period of years or to let the concession expire -
- must be made by the responsible contracting agency.  
In this paper, we have proposed a computational 
framework based on a Monte Carlo simulation and risk 
premium approach for determining the contract 
duration and optimal revenue sharing rate. Our 
proposed model makes use of sensitivity analysis and 
Monte Carlo simulation with the aim of providing the 
expected NPV-at-risk of the concessionaire and the risk 
profile of the renewed contract based on different 
revenue sharing rates so as to bracket an appropriate 
range for revenue shares, i.e., [ , ]l u  , which can be 
employed by the contracting agency in negotiating with 
the incumbent.  
We then applied the proposed model to the SSES 
project, a BTO elevated road located in Bangkok, 
Thailand. Based on the results of the study, which used 
the proposed method for the case project, it was shown 
that the contracting authority should renew the 
concession contract only when the revenue sharing rate is at 
least 48%.  
 
However, in case of PPP infrastructure projects, 
the first and greenfield concession period is rather long, 
i.e., 30 years in our case. Therefore, at the concession 
expiration, the project may have almost reached its 
maximum level of services, thereby capping maximum 
revenues, while operation and maintenance costs are 
increasingly significant risk factors since the project will 
be more costly to operate. Therefore, we suggest that a 
longer-term contract should be used only with an early 
termination clause that may be exercised when the 
concessionaire seriously fails to meet output 
performance. For example, the contract may include a 
5-year re-evaluation for performance in order for the 
contract to be continued. It is our hope that the 
proposed model presented in this study will be used by 
governments as an additional tool for analyzing 
concession duration and revenue sharing rates so that 
they can negotiate effectively with incumbents or 
establish a fair price when a competitive retendering 
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